* [2024] [[https://pyecsca.org/papers.html#pyecsca-reverse-engineering-black-box-elliptic-curve-cryptography-via-side-channel-analysis| Jančár, J.; Suchánek, V.; Švenda P.; Sedláček, V.; Chmielewski, L.: pyecsca: Reverse engineering black-box elliptic curve cryptography via side-channel analysis]], In IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Ruhr-University of Bochum, 2024, 355–381. **Received Honorable mention and Best Artifact Award**
* [2020] Jančár, J.; Sedláček, V.; Sýs, M.; Švenda, P.: [[https://minerva.crocs.fi.muni.cz/| Minerva: The curse of ECDSA nonces; Systematic analysis of lattice attacks on noisy leakage of bit-length of ECDSA nonces]], In IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES) 2020. **Received Best Paper Award**
* [2020] Jančár, J.; Sedláček, V.; Sýs, M.; Švenda, P.: [[https://minerva.crocs.fi.muni.cz/| Minerva: The curse of ECDSA nonces; Systematic analysis of lattice attacks on noisy leakage of bit-length of ECDSA nonces]], In IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES) 2020. **Received Best Paper Award**
* [2020] Klinec D.; Matyas V.: [[:public:papers:monero_ifipsec20| Privacy-Friendly Monero Transaction Signing on a Hardware Wallet]], In IFIP TC 11 International Conference (SEC) 2020.
* [2020] Klinec D.; Matyas V.: [[:public:papers:monero_ifipsec20| Privacy-Friendly Monero Transaction Signing on a Hardware Wallet]], In IFIP TC 11 International Conference (SEC) 2020.
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**Last update: 17. 01. 2024**
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**Last update: 20. 01. 2025**
**Contact:** Vašek Matyáš <matyas@fi.muni.cz>
**Contact:** Vašek Matyáš <matyas@fi.muni.cz>
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** Selected publications: **
** Selected publications: **
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* [2024] Fourné M., De Almeida Braga D., Jancar J., Sabt M., Schwabe P., Barthe G., Fouque P., Acar Y.: [[public:papers:usablect_usenix24|“These results must be false”: A usability evaluation of constant-time analysis tools]], USENIX Security 2024.
* [2022] Jancar J., Fourné M., De Almeida Braga D., Sabt M., Schwabe P., Barthe G., Fouque P., Acar Y.: [[public:papers:usablect_sp22|“They’re not that hard to mitigate”: What Cryptographic Library Developers Think About Timing Attacks]], IEEE S&P 2022.
* [2022] Jancar J., Fourné M., De Almeida Braga D., Sabt M., Schwabe P., Barthe G., Fouque P., Acar Y.: [[public:papers:usablect_sp22|“They’re not that hard to mitigate”: What Cryptographic Library Developers Think About Timing Attacks]], IEEE S&P 2022.
* [2022] Ukrop M., Balážová M., Žáčik P., Valčík E., Matyas V.: [[public:papers:eurousec2022|Assessing Real-World Applicability of Redesigned Developer Documentation for Certificate Validation Errors]], EuroUSEC 2022.
* [2022] Ukrop M., Balážová M., Žáčik P., Valčík E., Matyas V.: [[public:papers:eurousec2022|Assessing Real-World Applicability of Redesigned Developer Documentation for Certificate Validation Errors]], EuroUSEC 2022.
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Likely the most theoretical and math-heavy research we do, though still with real-world consequences in mind. We approach elliptic curves from many different directions: we study ECC implementations, problems with ECC formulas, ECC key datasets and in general diverse mathematical ideas involving elliptic curves. Sometimes, this requires us to dive into lattice methods as well.
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Likely the most theoretical and math-heavy research we do, though still with real-world consequences in mind. We approach elliptic curves from many different directions: we study ECC implementations, problems with ECC formulas, ECC key datasets, and, in general, diverse mathematical ideas involving elliptic curves. Sometimes, this requires us to dive into lattice methods as well.
In the past, we were systematically analyzing standardized elliptic curves. Lately, we have been mainly focusing on ECC with respect to side-channel attacks and the involvement of elliptic curves in the Bitcoin protocol.
In the past, we were systematically analyzing standardized elliptic curves. Lately, we have been mainly focusing on ECC with respect to side-channel attacks and the involvement of elliptic curves in the Bitcoin protocol.
* [2024] [[:public:papers:dcp_acns| Suchánek, V.; Sedláček, V.; Sýs, M.: Decompose and conquer: ZVP attacks on GLV curves]], In ACNS - Applied Cryptography and Network Security
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* [2024] [[https://pyecsca.org/papers.html#pyecsca-reverse-engineering-black-box-elliptic-curve-cryptography-via-side-channel-analysis| Jančár, J.; Suchánek, V.; Švenda P.; Sedláček, V.; Chmielewski, L.: pyecsca: Reverse engineering black-box elliptic curve cryptography via side-channel analysis]], In IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Ruhr-University of Bochum, 2024, 355–381. **Received Honorable mention and Best Artifact Award**
* [2022] [[https://dissect.crocs.fi.muni.cz/| Sedláček, V.; Suchánek, V.; Dufka A.; Sýs, M.; Matyáš, V.: DiSSECT: Distinguisher of Standard and Simulated Elliptic Curves via Traits]], In Progress in Cryptology - AFRICACRYPT 2022.
* [2022] [[https://dissect.crocs.fi.muni.cz/| Sedláček, V.; Suchánek, V.; Dufka A.; Sýs, M.; Matyáš, V.: DiSSECT: Distinguisher of Standard and Simulated Elliptic Curves via Traits]], In Progress in Cryptology - AFRICACRYPT 2022.
* [2021] [[:public:papers:formulas_asiacrypt21| Sedláček, V.; Chi-Domínguez, J.J.; Jančár, J.; Brumley, B.B.: A formula for disaster: a unified approach to elliptic curve special-point-based attacks]], In Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2021.
* [2021] [[:public:papers:formulas_asiacrypt21| Sedláček, V.; Chi-Domínguez, J.J.; Jančár, J.; Brumley, B.B.: A formula for disaster: a unified approach to elliptic curve special-point-based attacks]], In Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2021.