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public:papers:infocomm2016 [2016-01-13 16:04] – [New results on reduced-round Tiny Encryption Algorithm using genetic programming] petrs | public:papers:infocomm2016 [2018-03-31 15:00] – [New results on reduced-round Tiny Encryption Algorithm using genetic programming] xkubice8 | ||
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**Authors: Karel Kubicek, Jiri Novotny, Petr Svenda, Martin Ukrop** | **Authors: Karel Kubicek, Jiri Novotny, Petr Svenda, Martin Ukrop** | ||
- | <note tip>This paper is not published yet, therefore page is not yet finalzed</ | ||
**Abstract: | **Abstract: | ||
work of a skilled cryptanalyst. Some automation is possible, | work of a skilled cryptanalyst. Some automation is possible, | ||
Line 25: | Line 24: | ||
randomness distinguisher.// | randomness distinguisher.// | ||
- | * Journal page: [[http://fixme.org/ | + | * Journal page: [[http://www.infocommunications.hu/2016_1|Infocommunication journal]]. |
- | * Download author pre-print of the paper: {{: | + | * Download author pre-print of the paper: {{: |
- | * Download used version of EACirc tool and configuration files: {{: | + | * Download used version of EACirc tool and configuration files: {{: |
**Bibtex:** | **Bibtex:** | ||
- | FIXME | + | @article{eacirc-tea2016, |
- | @inproceedings{secrecyamplif_wistp2015, | + | |
- | author | + | author = {Karel Kubíček and Jiří Novotný and Petr Švenda and Martin Ukrop}, |
- | title = {On Secrecy Amplification Protocols}, | + | |
- | booktitle | + | |
- | LNCS 9311}, | + | |
- | year = {2015}, | + | pages = {2--9}, |
- | | + | |
- | doi = {10.1007/ | + | publisher = {Scientific Association for Infocommunications, |
- | | + | } |
- | | + | |
- | + | ||
- | | + | |
- | ---- | ||
---- | ---- | ||
+ | ==== What is this paper about? ===== | ||
+ | Automatized randomness testing is useful for checking one of the expected cipher properties – output ciphertext should be indistinguishable from a stream of truly random data. The common way to automate testing of randomness is using statistical batteries. But the limitation of the standard batteries for randomness testing is the fact they implement a fixed set of tests and can detect only a limited set of patterns and statistical irregularities. | ||
- | ===== What is this paper about? ===== | + | In this work we use EACirc -- a framework for constructing empirical tests of randomness. Capabilities of EACirc are compared with previous results as well as conventional statistical batteries analysing Tiny Encryption Algorithm. |
- | FIXME - update | + | //EACirc consistently performs better than NIST STS. Dieharder is able to detect small deviances in one additional round. But analysis |
- | + | ||
- | The secrecy amplification protocol provides description how messages with a fresh key material should be propagated inside a target network to provide secure link key to nodes with key currently compromised by an attacker. As wireless networks running on batteries are targeted, not only protocol' | + | |
- | + | ||
- | //A secrecy amplification protocol | + | |
**In this we paper, we:** | **In this we paper, we:** | ||
- | * Gave motivation, why secrecy amplification protocols should be used -- if enough neighbours are available in network | + | * Give motivation |
- | * Provided survey | + | * Summarize approach |
- | * Established upper bound of secrecy amplification protocol success rate for given network. | + | * Analyze TEA limited |
- | * Compared protocols wrt message efficiency, number of links they are able to secure | + | * Interprete various results from statistical batteries and EACirc |
- | * Discussed how hard is to execute secrecy amplification protocol in practice | + | * Compare performance |
- | * Introduced new class of hybrid secrecy amplification protocols, which are easier to synchronize | + | * Analyze resulting randomness test created by EACirc. |
- | + | ||
- | {{: | + | |
- | //Figure showing increase in the number of secured links after secrecy amplification protocols in the random | + | {{: |
- | compromise pattern on network with 20.3 legal neighbours on average. With in- | + | |
- | creasing number of neighbouring nodes the general effectiveness of protocol grows. | + | |
- | As can be seen, a strong majority of secure links (> 90%) can be obtained even | + | |
- | when the initial network had 70% of compromised links.// | + | |
- | {{: | + | //In the case of 4-round TEA on counter plaintexts (type 1), we analyzed several distinguishers with the fitness over 98%. In all of these circuits (see for example figure above) the distinguisher decision is based on the fourth byte of TEA ciphertext. The fourth byte is usually almost unchanged (operations affect only some bits).// |
- | //Figure showing increase in the number of secured links per message used during the protocol execution (random compromise pattern, 20.3 legal neighbours on average). The higher value is better - more links are secured per single message. Node-oriented protocols send significantly more messages with rising network density making them less effective per single message. This stands especially for 4-party node-oriented protocols, which are the least effective. The best tradeoff shows group-oriented and hybrid protocols.// | + | {{: |
- | + | ||
+ | //We also analyzed 4-round TEA on plaintexts suitable for strict avalanche criterion testing (type 3). In this case, the input layer had 16 input nodes, capable of processing two blocks of TEA ciphertext at once. Analyzed distinguishers (for example figure above) commonly combine the fourth byte of the first ciphertext block with the fourth byte of the second ciphertext block.// | ||