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public:papers:spw2016 [2016-06-19 21:24] – rostadalpublic:papers:spw2016 [2016-12-01 13:28] (current) – external edit 127.0.0.1
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 **In this paper, we:** **In this paper, we:**
-  * Provided three additional attacker models compared to the one used (Random Key compromise): +  * Provided three additional attacker models compared to the one used (Random Key compromise): key exfiltration model, passive node control model, and active node control model. Based on attacker capabilities, we also distinguish the global and local attacker. 
-    * key exfiltration model; +  * Proposed different ways of evaluation of SA protocols: a ratio of compromised and non-compromised link keys, a percentage of secure communication among neighbours, or the percentage of secure communication from nodes to the base station. 
-    * passive node control model; +  * Extended the KMSforWSN framework. The whole framework including the documentation could be download {{:public:papers:kmsforwsn_src.zip|here}}.
-    * active node control model. +
-  * Based on attacker capabilities, we also distinguish the global and local attacker. +
-  * Proposed different ways of evaluation of SA protocols: ratio of compromised and non-compromised link keys, percentage of secure communication among neighbours, or the percentage of secure communication from nodes to base station. +
-  * Extended the KMSforWSN framework. The whole framework including the documentation could be download above.+
   * Discussed different attacker capabilities and behaviour to parametrise the attacker.   * Discussed different attacker capabilities and behaviour to parametrise the attacker.
   * Performed an initial comparison of a local and global attacker on Random key compromise and Random node compromise pattern.   * Performed an initial comparison of a local and global attacker on Random key compromise and Random node compromise pattern.
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 {{:public:papers:infected_nodes.png?600|}} {{:public:papers:infected_nodes.png?600|}}
  
-//A success rate of SA protocols for a different number of malware infected nodes. A decrease in the percentage of secured links is linear. One can obtain reasonably secure network (more than 85% of secure links) even in case of 7 malware infected nodes considering the hybrid designed protocols are used.//+//A success rate of SA protocols for a different number of malware infected nodes. A decrease in the percentage of secured links is linear that is good considering the attacker's control over the node. One can obtain reasonably secure network (more than 85% of secure links) even in case of 7 malware infected nodes considering the hybrid designed protocols are used.//