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--- public:papers:spw2016 [2016-06-17 13:44] – [What is this paper about?] rostadal
+++ public:papers:spw2016 [2016-12-01 13:28] (current) – external edit 127.0.0.1
@@ Line 37: / Line 37: @@
 **In this paper, we:**
-  * Provided three additional attacker models compared to the one used (Random Key compromise):
+  * Provided three additional attacker models compared to the one used (Random Key compromise): key exfiltration model, passive node control model, and active node control model. Based on attacker capabilities, we also distinguish the global and local attacker.
-    * Key exfiltration model;
+  * Proposed different ways of evaluation of SA protocols: a ratio of compromised and non-compromised link keys, a percentage of secure communication among neighbours, or the percentage of secure communication from nodes to the base station.
-    * Passive node control model;
+  * Extended the KMSforWSN framework. The whole framework including the documentation could be download {{:public:papers:kmsforwsn_src.zip|here}}.
-    * Active node control model.
+  * Discussed different attacker capabilities and behaviour to parametrise the attacker.
-  * Based on attacker capabilities, we also distinguish the global and local attacker.
+  * Performed an initial comparison of a local and global attacker on Random key compromise and Random node compromise pattern.
-  * We are considering different ways of evaluation of SA protocols: ratio of compromised and non-compromised link keys, percentage of secure communication among neighbours, or the percentage of secure communication from nodes to base station.
-  * Extended the KMSforWSN framework. The whole framework including the documentation could be download above.
-  * Discussed different capabilities and behaviour to parametrise the attacker.
-  * Performed an initial comparison of a local and global attacker on Random key compromise and Random node compromise model.
   * Performed an experiment for Passive node control model.
-{{:public:papers:infected_nodes.png?500|}}
+{{:public:papers:infected_nodes.png?600|}}
-//A success rate of SA protocols for a different number of malware infected nodes. A decrease in the percentage of secured links is linear. One can obtain reasonably secure network (more than 85% of secure links) even in case of 7 malware infected nodes considering the hybrid designed protocols are used.//
+//A success rate of SA protocols for a different number of malware infected nodes. A decrease in the percentage of secured links is linear that is good considering the attacker's control over the node. One can obtain reasonably secure network (more than 85% of secure links) even in case of 7 malware infected nodes considering the hybrid designed protocols are used.//