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| ===== What is this paper about? ===== | ===== What is this paper about? ===== | ||
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| + | Ad-hoc networks often handle highly sensitive information and security of such networks is a typical baseline requirement. Secure link communication is the building block for many security services maintained by a network. Ad-hoc networks also present several challenges like limited computational and storage resources or an energy source, usually in the form of a battery. | ||
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| + | The attacker in that environment is usually able to capture a node itself and read out all keying material as there typically is no tamper resistance. After the initial compromise, the global attacker is expected. | ||
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| + | The secrecy amplification (SA) protocols were proposed to re-secure some previously compromised communication links using non-compromised paths to deliver new secure keys. The comprehensive overview of SA protocols could be found [[http:// | ||
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| + | **In this paper, we:** | ||
| + | * Provided three additional attacker models compared to the one used (Random Key compromise): | ||
| + | * Proposed different ways of evaluation of SA protocols: a ratio of compromised and non-compromised link keys, a percentage of secure communication among neighbours, or the percentage of secure communication from nodes to the base station. | ||
| + | * Extended the KMSforWSN framework. The whole framework including the documentation could be download {{: | ||
| + | * Discussed different attacker capabilities and behaviour to parametrise the attacker. | ||
| + | * Performed an initial comparison of a local and global attacker on Random key compromise and Random node compromise pattern. | ||
| + | * Performed an experiment for Passive node control model. | ||
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| + | {{: | ||
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| + | //A success rate of SA protocols for a different number of malware infected nodes. A decrease in the percentage of secured links is linear that is good considering the attacker' | ||