Differences
This shows you the differences between two versions of the page.
Both sides previous revision Previous revision Next revision | Previous revision | ||
public:papers:spw2016 [2016-06-16 23:30] – rostadal | public:papers:spw2016 [2016-12-01 13:28] (current) – external edit 127.0.0.1 | ||
---|---|---|---|
Line 12: | Line 12: | ||
**Bibtex:** | **Bibtex:** | ||
+ | |||
| | ||
| | ||
Line 28: | Line 29: | ||
===== What is this paper about? ===== | ===== What is this paper about? ===== | ||
- | FIXME | + | |
+ | Ad-hoc networks often handle highly sensitive information and security of such networks is a typical baseline requirement. Secure link communication is the building block for many security services maintained by a network. Ad-hoc networks also present several challenges like limited computational and storage resources or an energy source, usually in the form of a battery. | ||
+ | |||
+ | The attacker in that environment is usually able to capture a node itself and read out all keying material as there typically is no tamper resistance. After the initial compromise, the global attacker is expected. | ||
+ | |||
+ | The secrecy amplification (SA) protocols were proposed to re-secure some previously compromised communication links using non-compromised paths to deliver new secure keys. The comprehensive overview of SA protocols could be found [[http:// | ||
+ | |||
+ | **In this paper, we:** | ||
+ | * Provided three additional attacker models compared to the one used (Random Key compromise): | ||
+ | * Proposed different ways of evaluation of SA protocols: a ratio of compromised and non-compromised link keys, a percentage of secure communication among neighbours, or the percentage of secure communication from nodes to the base station. | ||
+ | * Extended the KMSforWSN framework. The whole framework including the documentation could be download {{: | ||
+ | * Discussed different attacker capabilities and behaviour to parametrise the attacker. | ||
+ | * Performed an initial comparison of a local and global attacker on Random key compromise and Random node compromise pattern. | ||
+ | * Performed an experiment for Passive node control model. | ||
+ | |||
+ | {{: | ||
+ | |||
+ | //A success rate of SA protocols for a different number of malware infected nodes. A decrease in the percentage of secured links is linear that is good considering the attacker' |