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| <button type="warning" icon="fa fa-file-pdf-o">[[https://crocs.fi.muni.cz/_media/public/papers/2019-secrypt-sedlacek.pdf|Pre-print PDF]]</button> | <button type="warning" icon="fa fa-file-pdf-o">[[https://crocs.fi.muni.cz/_media/public/papers/2019-secrypt-sedlacek.pdf|Pre-print PDF]]</button> |
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| /* | <button type="warning" icon="fa fa-file-pdf-o">[[https://crocs.fi.muni.cz/_media/public/papers/2019-secrypt-sedlacek-presentation.pdf|Presentation]]</button> |
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| <button collapse="bibtex" icon="fa fa-file-code-o">BiBTeX</button> | <button collapse="bibtex" icon="fa fa-file-code-o">BiBTeX</button> |
| Title = {I want to break square-free: The 4p-1 factorization method and its RSA backdoor viability}, | Title = {I want to break square-free: The 4p-1 factorization method and its RSA backdoor viability}, |
| Author = {Vladimir Sedlacek, Dusan Klinec, Marek Sys, Petr Svenda, Vashek Matyas}, | Author = {Vladimir Sedlacek, Dusan Klinec, Marek Sys, Petr Svenda, Vashek Matyas}, |
| booktitle = {14th International Conference on Security and Cryptography (Secrypt'2017)}, | booktitle = {16th International Conference on Security and Cryptography (Secrypt'2019)}, |
| Year = {2019}, | Year = {2019}, |
| publisher = {SCITEPRESS} | publisher = {SCITEPRESS} |
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| <panel type="default" title="Abstract"> | **Abstract:** |
| In this paper, we analyze Cheng's $4p-1$ factorization method as the means of a potential backdoor for the RSA primes generated inside black-box devices like cryptographic smartcards and we devise three detection methods for such a backdoor. We also audit 44 millions of RSA keypairs generated by 18 different types of cryptographic devices. Finally, we offer an improved, simplified and asymptotically deterministic version of the method, together with a deeper analysis of its performance and we publish a Sage implementation. | |
| </panel> | |
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| | In this paper, we analyze Cheng's $4p-1$ factorization method as the means of a potential backdoor for the RSA primes generated inside black-box devices like cryptographic smartcards, and we devise three detection methods for such a backdoor. We also audit 44 millions of RSA keypairs generated by 18 different types of cryptographic devices. Finally, we offer an improved, simplified and asymptotically deterministic version of the method, together with a deeper analysis of its performance and we publish a Sage implementation (we are currently not aware of any other public implementation). |
| ===== Key insights ===== | ===== Key insights ===== |
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