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public:papers:rsa_ccs17 [2018-01-24 08:19] – [ROCA: Vulnerable RSA generation (CVE-2017-15361)] xsvendapublic:papers:rsa_ccs17 [2023-07-16 11:34] (current) – [Media] xsvenda
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 ====== ROCA: Vulnerable RSA generation (CVE-2017-15361) ====== ====== ROCA: Vulnerable RSA generation (CVE-2017-15361) ======
 ~~NOTOC~~ ~~NOTOC~~
 +====== Paper details ======
 +**Paper title: The Return of Coppersmith's Attack: Practical Factorization of Widely Used RSA Moduli [ACM CCS 2017]**\\
 +**Authors: Matus Nemec, Marek Sys, Petr Svenda, Dusan Klinec and Vashek Matyas**\\
 +**Primary contact:** Petr Svenda <svenda@fi.muni.cz> 
 +
 +  * Conference page: [[https://www.sigsac.org/ccs/CCS2017/ | ACM CCS 2017]]
 +  * Author ePrint version of the paper: {{ :public:papers:nemec_roca_ccs17_preprint.pdf | pdf}}
 +  * Conference slides: {{ {{ :public:papers:ccs-nemec-handout.pdf | pdf}}
 +  * Poster: {{ :public:papers:nemec_roca_csaw_poster.pdf | pdf}}
 +
 +**Bibtex (regular paper)**
 +
 +  @inproceedings{2017-ccs-nemec,
 +    Author        = {Matus Nemec and Marek Sys and Petr Svenda and Dusan Klinec and Vashek Matyas},
 +    Title         = {{The Return of Coppersmith's Attack: Practical Factorization of Widely Used RSA Moduli}},
 +    BookTitle     = {24th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'2017)},
 +    Year          = {2017},
 +    ISBN          = {978-1-4503-4946-8/17/10},
 +    Publisher     = {ACM},
 +    Pages         = {1631-1648}
 +  }
 +
 **<TLDR>**  **<TLDR>** 
  
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   * 2048 bit RSA keys – 140.8 CPU years, (the cost of $20,000 - $40,000).   * 2048 bit RSA keys – 140.8 CPU years, (the cost of $20,000 - $40,000).
  
-The vulnerability was found by a close inspection of a large number of RSA keys generated and exported from the manufacturer smartcards by researchers at CRoCS laboratory, Masaryk University, Enigma Bridge and Ca' Foscari University. The full results will be presented at an academic ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS '17) starting from October 30th. +The vulnerability was found by a close inspection of a large number of RSA keys generated and exported from the manufacturer smartcards by researchers at CRoCS laboratory, Masaryk University, Enigma Bridge and Ca' Foscari University. The full results were presented at an academic ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS '17) in November 2017. 
  
-The vulnerability was disclosed to Infineon Technologies AG, following the responsible disclosure principle, in the first week of February with agreement of an 8 month period before a public disclosure. We cooperated with the manufacturer and other affected parties to help evaluate and mitigate this vulnerability during this period. Major vendors including Microsoft, Google, HP, Lenovo, Fujitsu already released the software updates and guidelines for a mitigation. We are now notifying general public and releasing tools for assessmnet of the individual keys. +The vulnerability was disclosed to Infineon Technologies AG, following the responsible disclosure principle, in the first week of February with agreement of an 8 month period before a public disclosure. We cooperated with the manufacturer and other affected parties to help evaluate and mitigate this vulnerability during this period. Major vendors including Microsoft, Google, HP, Lenovo, Fujitsu already released the software updates and guidelines for a mitigation. We are now notifying general public and releasing tools for assessment of the individual keys. 
  
 ===== Impact ===== ===== Impact =====
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   * SC Media: https://www.scmagazineuk.com/roca-the-role-of-key-generation-and-decrypting-of-private-keys/article/704343/   * SC Media: https://www.scmagazineuk.com/roca-the-role-of-key-generation-and-decrypting-of-private-keys/article/704343/
   * Cybernetica: https://cyber.ee/en/news/cybernetica-case-study-solving-the-estonian-id-card-case/   * Cybernetica: https://cyber.ee/en/news/cybernetica-case-study-solving-the-estonian-id-card-case/
 +  * Infineon: https://www.infineon.com/cms/en/product/promopages/rsa-update/rsa-background
  
  
-====== Paper details ====== 
-**Paper title: The Return of Coppersmith's Attack: Practical Factorization of Widely Used RSA Moduli [ACM CCS 2017]**\\ 
-**Authors: Matus Nemec, Marek Sys, Petr Svenda, Dusan Klinec and Vashek Matyas**\\ 
-**Primary contact:** Petr Svenda <svenda@fi.muni.cz>  
- 
-  * Conference page: [[https://www.sigsac.org/ccs/CCS2017/ | ACM CCS 2017]] 
-  * Author ePrint version of the paper: {{ :public:papers:nemec_roca_ccs17_preprint.pdf | pdf}} 
-  * Conference slides: {{ {{ :public:papers:ccs-nemec-handout.pdf | pdf}} 
- 
-**Bibtex (regular paper)** 
- 
-  @inproceedings{2017-ccs-nemec, 
-    Author        = {Matus Nemec and Marek Sys and Petr Svenda and Dusan Klinec and Vashek Matyas}, 
-    Title         = {{The Return of Coppersmith's Attack: Practical Factorization of Widely Used RSA Moduli}}, 
-    BookTitle     = {24th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'2017)}, 
-    Year          = {2017}, 
-    ISBN          = {978-1-4503-4946-8/17/10}, 
-    Publisher     = {ACM}, 
-    Pages         = {1631-1648} 
-  } 
  
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