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public:papers:rsa_ccs17 [2017-10-31 17:19] – [Technical references] xsvenda | public:papers:rsa_ccs17 [2018-04-04 07:39] – [Description of the vulnerability] xsvenda | ||
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**< | **< | ||
- | A newly discovered vulnerability in generation of RSA keys used by a software library adopted in cryptographic smartcards, security tokens and other secure hardware chips manufactured by Infineon Technologies AG allows for a practical factorization attack, in which the attacker computes the private part of an RSA key. The attack is feasible for commonly used key lengths, including 1024 and 2048 bits, and affects chips manufactured as early as 2012, that are now commonplace. Assess your keys now with the provided [[https:// | + | **Release date: 16th October, 2017** |
+ | |||
+ | A newly discovered vulnerability in generation of RSA keys used by a software library adopted in cryptographic smartcards, security tokens and other secure hardware chips manufactured by Infineon Technologies AG allows for a practical factorization attack, in which the attacker computes the private part of an RSA key. The attack is feasible for commonly used key lengths, including 1024 and 2048 bits, and affects chips manufactured as early as 2012, that are now commonplace. Assess your keys now with the provided [[https:// | ||
+ | |||
+ | Download full paper: {{ : | ||
**</ | **</ | ||
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* 2048 bit RSA keys – 140.8 CPU years, (the cost of $20,000 - $40,000). | * 2048 bit RSA keys – 140.8 CPU years, (the cost of $20,000 - $40,000). | ||
- | The vulnerability was found by a close inspection of a large number of RSA keys generated and exported from the manufacturer smartcards by researchers at CRoCS laboratory, Masaryk University, Enigma Bridge and Ca' Foscari University. The full results | + | The vulnerability was found by a close inspection of a large number of RSA keys generated and exported from the manufacturer smartcards by researchers at CRoCS laboratory, Masaryk University, Enigma Bridge and Ca' Foscari University. The full results |
- | The vulnerability was disclosed to Infineon Technologies AG, following the responsible disclosure principle, in the first week of February with agreement of an 8 month period before a public disclosure. We cooperated with the manufacturer and other affected parties to help evaluate and mitigate this vulnerability during this period. Major vendors including Microsoft, Google, HP, Lenovo, Fujitsu already released the software updates and guidelines for a mitigation. We are now notifying general public and releasing tools for assessmnet | + | The vulnerability was disclosed to Infineon Technologies AG, following the responsible disclosure principle, in the first week of February with agreement of an 8 month period before a public disclosure. We cooperated with the manufacturer and other affected parties to help evaluate and mitigate this vulnerability during this period. Major vendors including Microsoft, Google, HP, Lenovo, Fujitsu already released the software updates and guidelines for a mitigation. We are now notifying general public and releasing tools for assessment |
===== Impact ===== | ===== Impact ===== | ||
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===== Updates ===== | ===== Updates ===== | ||
- | * 2nd of November | + | * 2nd of November - Presentation of ROCA at the ACM CCS conference, received Real-World Impact Award |
- | * 16th of October 2017 - The initial version of the public disclosure published | + | * 30th October 2017 - Full paper made public: [[https:// |
+ | * 16th of October 2017 - The initial version of the public disclosure published, detector of vulnerable keys [[https:// | ||
* May to October 2017 - Cooperation with the manufacturer and other affected parties to help evaluate and mitigate the vulnerability | * May to October 2017 - Cooperation with the manufacturer and other affected parties to help evaluate and mitigate the vulnerability | ||
* 1st of February - The vulnerability disclosed to Infineon Technologies AG | * 1st of February - The vulnerability disclosed to Infineon Technologies AG | ||
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* CVE-2017-15361: | * CVE-2017-15361: | ||
* National Cyber Security Centre, UK: https:// | * National Cyber Security Centre, UK: https:// | ||
+ | * D.J.Bernstein and T. Lange, Reconstructing ROCA: https:// | ||
===== Media ===== | ===== Media ===== | ||
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* ArsTechnica: | * ArsTechnica: | ||
* RSA Security: https:// | * RSA Security: https:// | ||
+ | * ArsTechnica: | ||
+ | * SC Media: https:// | ||
+ | * Cybernetica: | ||
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* Conference page: [[https:// | * Conference page: [[https:// | ||
- | * Download author | + | * Author |
+ | * Conference slides: {{ {{ : | ||
- | **Bibtex (regular paper):** | + | **Bibtex (regular paper)** |
@inproceedings{2017-ccs-nemec, | @inproceedings{2017-ccs-nemec, | ||
Author | Author | ||
- | Title = {The Return of Coppersmith' | + | Title |
BookTitle | BookTitle | ||
Year = {2017}, | Year = {2017}, |