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public:papers:primality_esorics20 [2020-09-11 12:51] – [Selected conclusions] x408178public:papers:primality_esorics20 [2021-12-04 20:28] (current) – [Summarizing video] x408178
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 <button type="warning" icon="fa fa-file-pdf-o">[[https://crocs.fi.muni.cz/_media/publications/pdf/2020-esorics-foolingprimes.pdf|Pre-print PDF]]</button> <button type="warning" icon="fa fa-file-pdf-o">[[https://crocs.fi.muni.cz/_media/publications/pdf/2020-esorics-foolingprimes.pdf|Pre-print PDF]]</button>
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-<popover trigger="focus" title="Not yet available" content="Presentation will be added soon."> +<button icon="fa fa-file-image-o">[[https://crocs.fi.muni.cz/_media/publications/pdf/esorics2020_pseudoprimes_final.pdf |Presentation]]</button>
-<button icon="fa fa-file-image-o">Presentation</button> +
-</popover>+
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 <button collapse="bibtex" icon="fa fa-file-code-o">BiBTeX</button> <button collapse="bibtex" icon="fa fa-file-code-o">BiBTeX</button>
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 <button type="primary" icon="fa fa-github">[[https://github.com/crocs-muni/fooling-primality-tests|GitHub]]</button>  <button type="primary" icon="fa fa-github">[[https://github.com/crocs-muni/fooling-primality-tests|GitHub]]</button> 
  
 +===== Summarizing video =====
 +
 +{{ youtube>Gv6ZSgGr3Qs?900x520 |Fooling primality tests on smartcards}}
  
 ===== Selected conclusions ===== ===== Selected conclusions =====
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   * Issues found were responsibly disclosed to the affected vendors, but the vulnerability is not easily mitigated for the already deployed smartcards. The code responsible for the domain parameter validation is often stored in a read only memory without the possibility for an update. In addition, the missing primality testing function in the API prevents the developer the check the parameters on-card.   * Issues found were responsibly disclosed to the affected vendors, but the vulnerability is not easily mitigated for the already deployed smartcards. The code responsible for the domain parameter validation is often stored in a read only memory without the possibility for an update. In addition, the missing primality testing function in the API prevents the developer the check the parameters on-card.
   * Besides allowing API primality testing, full domain parameter validation and supporting only named curves (though this limits future flexibility) should mitigate the vulnerability. On a lower level, using either Miller-Rabin with random bases or the Baillie-PSW primality test should detect all composites.   * Besides allowing API primality testing, full domain parameter validation and supporting only named curves (though this limits future flexibility) should mitigate the vulnerability. On a lower level, using either Miller-Rabin with random bases or the Baillie-PSW primality test should detect all composites.
 +
 +===== Acknowledgements =====
 +J. Jancar was supported by the grant MUNI/C/1701/2018, V.Sedlacek by the Czech Science Foundation project GA2003426S and the Brno Ph.D. Talent Scholarship (funded by the Brno City Municipality). Some of the tools used and P.Svenda were supported by the CyberSec4Europe Competence Network. Computational resources were supplied by the project e-INFRA LM2018140.