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public:papers:formulas_asiacrypt21 [2021-08-26 11:33] – created xjancarpublic:papers:formulas_asiacrypt21 [2021-12-04 20:41] (current) – [Summarizing video] x408178
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 <button type="warning" icon="fa fa-fw fa-file-pdf-o">[[https://crocs.fi.muni.cz/_media/publications/pdf/2021-asiacrypt-formulas.pdf|PRE-PRINT PDF]]</button> <button type="warning" icon="fa fa-fw fa-file-pdf-o">[[https://crocs.fi.muni.cz/_media/publications/pdf/2021-asiacrypt-formulas.pdf|PRE-PRINT PDF]]</button>
 +\_
 +<button icon="fa fa-file-image-o">[[https://crocs.fi.muni.cz/_media/public/papers/asiacrypt2021_formula_presentation.pdf |Presentation]]</button>
 \_ \_
 <button collapse="bibtex" icon="fa fa-fw fa-file-code-o">BiBTeX</button> <button collapse="bibtex" icon="fa fa-fw fa-file-code-o">BiBTeX</button>
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 <panel type="default" title="Abstract"> <panel type="default" title="Abstract">
-The Refined Power Analysis, Zero-Value Point, and Exceptional Procedure attacks introduced side-channel attack techniques against specific cases of elliptic curve cryptography. The three attacks recover bits of a static ECDH key adaptively, collecting information on whether a certain multiple of the input point was computed. We unify and generalize these attacks in a common framework and solve the corresponding problem for a broader class of inputs. We also introduce a version of the attack against windowed scalar multiplication methods, recovering the full scalar instead of just a part of it. Finally, we systematically analyze elliptic curve point addition formulas from the Explicit-Formulas Database, classify all non-trivial exceptional points, and find them in new formulas. These results indicate the usefulness of our tooling for unrolling formulas and finding special pointswhich might be of independent research interest.+The Refined Power Analysis, Zero-Value Point, and Exceptional Procedure attacks 
 +introduced side-channel attack techniques against specific cases of elliptic curve cryptography. 
 +The three attacks recover bits of a static ECDH key adaptively, 
 +collecting information on whether a certain multiple of the input point was computed. 
 +We unify and generalize these attacks in a common frameworkand solve the corresponding problem 
 +for a broader class of inputs. We also introduce a version of 
 +the attack against windowed scalar multiplication methods, recovering the full scalar 
 +instead of just a part of it. Finally, we systematically analyze elliptic curve 
 +point addition formulas from the Explicit-Formulas Database, 
 +classify all non-trivial exceptional points, and find them in new formulas. 
 +These results indicate the usefulness of our tooling for unrolling formulas and finding 
 +special points which we released publicly, potentially of independent research interest.
 </panel> </panel>
  
 +===== Summarizing video =====
 + [[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJY0A2IPVLE|IACR YouTube video]]
 +
 +
 +===== Research artifacts (supplementary material) =====
 +
 +<button type="primary" icon="fa fa-fw fa-database">[[https://github.com/crocs-muni/formula-for-disaster|Go to artifacts repository (github)]]</button>