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- | ====== On Secrecy Amplification Protocols | + | ====== On the impact of warning interfaces for enabling the detection of Potentially Unwanted Applications |
- | **Authors: | + | **Authors: |
- | <note tip> | ||
- | **Abstract: | + | **Abstract: |
- | on used cryptographic keys without necessity | + | |
- | | + | Our results indicate a strong desire for PUAs detection by users. In particular, enabling PUAs detection was chosen by 74.5% of our participants for our initial control interface. Further, a modified interface in which the option to enable PUAs detection was presented first resulted in 89.8% of participants choosing to enable PUAs detection (a statistically significant increase from the control) |
- | * Download author pre-print of the paper: {{: | + | |
- | * Download extended version of paper: {{: | + | |
- | * Download presentation: | + | * Download author pre-print of the paper: {{: |
- | * Download used simulator and configuration files: {{: | + | * Download presentation: |
+ | |||
- | **Bibtex:** | ||
- | | ||
- | | ||
- | title = {On Secrecy Amplification Protocols}, | ||
- | | ||
- | LNCS 9311}, | ||
- | year = {2015}, | ||
- | pages = {3--19}, | ||
- | doi = {10.1007/ | ||
- | | ||
- | } | ||
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===== What is this paper about? ===== | ===== What is this paper about? ===== | ||
- | The secrecy amplification protocol provides description how messages | + | Detailed descriptio together |
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- | //A secrecy amplification protocol can be pretty effective: a network with 50-70 % of compromised links can be turned into network with 95+ % secure links for the price of small hundreds of messages (per node) in only tens of seconds.// | + | |
- | + | ||
- | **In this we paper, we:** | + | |
- | * Gave motivation, why secrecy amplification protocols should be used -- if enough neighbours are available in network and random compromise pattern is assumed, network with only 30 % secure can be turned into network with more then 95 % secure links. | + | |
- | * Provided survey of all published secrecy amplification protocols (13 in total). | + | |
- | * Established upper bound of secrecy amplification protocol success rate for given network. | + | |
- | * Compared protocols wrt message efficiency, number of links they are able to secure and other characteristics. | + | |
- | * Discussed how hard is to execute secrecy amplification protocol in practice on real node (TelosB, TinyOS). | + | |
- | * Introduced new class of hybrid secrecy amplification protocols, which are easier to synchronize and provide very good tradeoff between number of secure links (higher the better) and messages transmitted (lower the better). | + | |
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- | {{: | + | |
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- | //Figure showing increase in the number of secured links after secrecy amplification protocols in the random | + | |
- | compromise pattern on network with 20.3 legal neighbours on average. With in- | + | |
- | creasing number of neighbouring nodes the general effectiveness of protocol grows. | + | |
- | As can be seen, a strong majority of secure links (> 90%) can be obtained even | + | |
- | when the initial network had 70% of compromised links.// | + | |
- | + | ||
- | {{: | + | |
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- | //Figure showing increase in the number of secured links per message used during the protocol execution (random compromise pattern, 20.3 legal neighbours on average). The higher value is better - more links are secured per single message. Node-oriented protocols send significantly more messages with rising network density making them less effective per single message. This stands especially for 4-party node-oriented protocols, which are the least effective. The best tradeoff shows group-oriented and hybrid protocols.// | + | |
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