Towards cryptographic function distinguishers with evolutionary circuits

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Abstract: Cryptanalysis of a cryptographic function usually requires advanced cryptanalytical skills and extensive amount of human labour. However, some automation is possible, e.g., by using randomness testing suites like STS NIST (Rukhin, 2010) or Dieharder (Brown, 2004). These can be applied to test statistical properties of cryptographic function outputs. Yet such testing suites are limited only to predefined patterns testing particular statistical defects. We propose a more open approach based on a combination of software circuits and evolutionary algorithms to search for unwanted statistical properties like next bit predictability, random data non-distinguishability or strict avalanche criterion. Software circuit that acts as a testing function is automatically evolved by a stochastic optimization algorithm and uses information leaked during cryptographic function evaluation. We tested this general approach on problem of finding a distinguisher (Englund et al., 2007) of outputs produced by several candidate algorithms for eStream competition from truly random sequences. We obtained similar results (with some exceptions) as those produced by STS NIST and Dieharder tests w.r.t. the number of rounds of the inspected algorithm. This paper focuses on providing solid assessment of the proposed approach w.r.t. STS NIST and Dieharder when applied over multiple different algorithms rather than obtaining best possible result for a particular one. Additionally, proposed approach is able to provide random distinguisher even when presented with very short sequence like 16 bytes only.

The supplement data can be found at http://www.fi.muni.cz/~xsvenda/papers/secrypt2013/.

1 INTRODUCTION

The main motivation for this work is to provide a tool with the crucial ability to automatically probe for unwanted properties of cryptographic functions that signalize flaws in the function design. Although proper and repeated cryptanalysis by a human cryptanalyst (often assisted by automated tools) is by far the most successful approach to assert function overall security, one may want to automatically test for known statistical defects present in output produced by a function. Additionally, output testing for a given implementation of a particular cryptographic function is required to detect implementation errors.

Typical cryptanalytical approach against a new cryptographic function is usually based on application of various statistical testing tools (e.g., STS NIST, Dieharder) as the first step. Then follows application of established cryptanalytical procedures (algorithmic attacks, differential cryptanalysis, etc.) combined with an in-depth knowledge of the inspected function. The first step can be at least partly automated and (relatively) easy to apply, but will detect only the most visible defects in the function design or apply only to a limited number of algorithm rounds. The second approach usually yields much stronger insight and detects more significant defects, but usually requires extensive human cryptanalytical labour. Additionally, general statistical testing tools are limited to a predefined set of statistical tests. That on one hand makes the follow-up analytical work easier if the function fails a certain test, yet on the other hand severely limits the potential to detect other defects.

We propose a novel approach based on combination of an automatically generated algorithm in form of a hardware-like circuit designed by evolutionary algorithms (more specifically, by genetic programming). Evolutionary algorithms were previously used to probe specific problems of a particular function (e.g., DES, TEA, XTEA), yet for their really useful application, the identification of specific sub-problems like deviation of $\chi^2$ Goodness of Fit tests applied to statistic of least significant bits (Castro and Vifuela, 2005) was required. Our approach may directly provide a distinguisher without prior identification of such sub-problems as well as be used when...
such a property was identified, providing a higher degree of freedom when searching for a distinguisher.

We designed and tested an automated process that can be used in a similar manner as general statistical testing suites, but additionally provides the possibility to construct (again automatically) new tests. We represent the “tests” as a hardware-like circuit emulated in software that execute over given inputs and computes outputs. Evolutionary algorithms (EAs) are used to design the circuit layout (“wires” and “gates”). Although such an automated tool will not (at least for the moment) outperform a skilled cryptographer, still it brings two major advantages:

- It can be applied automatically against multiple different cryptographic functions with no additional human labour – working implementation of the inspected function is sufficient. Cryptographic function competitions like AES (AES, 1997), SHA-3 (SHA-3, 2007) or eStream (ECRYPT, 2004) are providing a particular advantage because candidate functions have to comply with a standard programming interface (API), further easing tests of numerous functions.

- It may discover and use other information leakage “side channels” of the function than those usually assumed by cryptographers. The proposed approach does not require pre-selection of particular parts of the function or input/output bits or to define statistics used – this decision is left to the evolutionary algorithm. Note that the proposed approach may lead to even better results if a cryptoanalyst targets only a specific part of the inspected function.

We implemented the proposed approach (more details given in Section 3) and tested our idea on random distinguishers of output from several eStream candidate functions (see Section 4). To assess the success and usefulness of this method, we focused on functions with inner structure containing repeated rounds. By gradually increasing the number of rounds used in a function, one can identify the maximum number of rounds where the approach still provides results (i.e., distinguisher with better probability than random guessing). Results are very similar to those obtained from STS NIST and Dieharder test suites w.r.t. the number of rounds of the inspected function.

2 PREVIOUS WORK

Numerous works tackled the problem of distinguisher construction between data produced by cryptographic functions and truly random data, both with reduced and full number of rounds. Usually, statistical testing with battery of tests (e.g., STS NIST (Rukhin, 2010) or Dieharder (Brown, 2004)) or additional custom tailored statistical tests are performed. The STS NIST battery was used to evaluate fifteen AES (round 2) candidates, demonstrating some deviation from randomness in six candidates (Soto, 1999). In (Turan et al., 2006), detailed examination of eStream Phase 2 candidates (full and reduced round tests) with STS NIST battery and structural randomness tests was performed, finding six ciphers deviating from expected values. More recently, the same battery, but only a subset of the tests, was applied to the SHA-3 candidates (in the second round of competition, 14 in total) for a reduced number of rounds as well as only to compression function of algorithm (Dogakosoy et al., 2010). Additionally, custom-built statistical tests based on strict avalanche criterion and others were used, resulting in estimation of relative security margins of candidates w.r.t. the number of rounds. (Sulak et al., 2010) proposed a method to test statistical properties of short sequences typically obtained by block ciphers or hash algorithms for which some from STS NIST can not be applied due to insufficient length. Probabilities expressed by p-values are calculated for each short subinterval and improved method based on recalibration of expected probabilities is provided. Example results applied to selected block and hash functions are presented. 256-bit versions of SHA-3 finalists were subjected to statistical tests using a GPU-accelerated evaluation (Kaminsky, 2012). Both algorithms and selected tests from STS NIST battery were implemented for the nVidia CUDA platform. Because of massive parallelization, superpoly tests introduced by (Dimur and Shamir, 2009) were possible to be performed, detecting some deviations in all but the Grøstl algorithm.

Stochastic algorithms were also applied in cryptography to some extent, focusing initially mostly on simple transposition and substitution ciphers or problems like efficient knapsack algorithm. A nice review of usage of genetic algorithms in cryptography up to year 2004 can be found in (Delman, 2004), a more recent review of evolutionary methods used in cryptography is provided by (Picek and Golub, 2011). TEA algorithm (Wheeler and Needham, 1995) with a reduced number of rounds is a frequent target for cryptoanalysis with genetic algorithms. In (Castro and Viñuela, 2005), a successful randomness distinguisher for XTEA limited to 4 rounds is generated with genetic algorithms. The distinguisher generates a bit mask with high Hamming weight which when applied to function input, resulting in deviated $\chi^2$ Goodness of Fit test of the output. Addi-
tionally, a special behaviour of the TEA algorithm with full number of rounds was observed when XOR-ing instead of adding the mask. However no distinguisher for full number of rounds was found. Subsequent work (Hu, 2010) improves an earlier attack with quantum-inspired genetic algorithms, finding more efficient distinguishers for a reduced round TEA algorithm and succeeding for the 5-round TEA. In (Garrett et al., 2007) a comparison of genetic techniques is presented, with several suggestions which genetic techniques and parameters should be used to obtain better results. We adopted the genetic programming (Banzhaf et al., 1997) technique with steady-state replacement (Liu et al., 2008). An important difference of our approach from previous work is the production of a program (in the form of a software circuit) that provides different results depending on given inputs. Previous work produced a fixed result, e.g., bit mask in (Castro and Vinuela, 2005; Hu, 2010) that is directly applied to all inputs.

Structure of a software circuit resembles artificial neural networks (NN) to some extent. Notable differences are in the learning mechanism and in a high number of layers used in our software circuit (NN usually use only three). Recently, deep belief neural networks (DBNN) were proposed (Hinton et al., 2006) with the learning algorithm based on restricted Boltzmann machines that also use 5 or even more layers. Still, a software circuit uses mutation and crossover to converge towards an optimum instead of back propagation in case of classical NN or lay-by-layer learning algorithm for DBNN. Also, different functions may be computed inside every node in case of software circuit instead of weighted sum of DBNN.

3 SOFTWARE CIRCUIT DESIGNED BY EVOLUTION

Software circuit is a software representation of a hardware-like circuit with nodes (“gates”) responsible for computation of simple functions (e.g., AND, OR). Nodes are positioned in layers where outputs from the previous layer are provided as inputs to the nodes in the following layer by connectors (“wires”). Input to the whole circuit is simulated as an output of the first layer and output of last layer is taken as the output of whole circuit. Connectors might connect a node to all nodes from a previous layer, to only some of them, or to none at all. Connectors in a software circuit may also cross each other as they are emulated – in contrary to real single-layer hardware circuits. A simple circuit can be seen in Figure 1.

Examples of such a circuit might be a Boolean circuit where functions computed in nodes are limited to logical functions or artificial neural networks where nodes compute the weighted sum of the inputs. Besides studying complexity problems, these circuits were used in various applications like construction of a fully homomorphic scheme (Gentry, 2010) or in design of efficient image filters (Sekanina et al., 2012). Circuit evaluation can be performed by a software emulator that propagates input values, computes functions and collects outputs in nodes or possibly directly in hardware when FPGAs are used (Sekanina et al., 2012).

Figure 1: Software circuit with input nodes (IN_x), inner nodes, output nodes (x_OUT) and connectors. Note that not all input or output nodes need to be used as well not all inner nodes need to output any value.

3.1 How to design circuit layout

Circuit design can be laid out by an experienced human designer, automatically synthetized from the source code or even automatically initialized and then improved by an optimization algorithm. We use the last approach and combine a software circuit evaluated on a CPU (or also on GPUs) with evolutionary algorithms (EAs). The main goal is to find a circuit that will reveal an unwanted defect in the inspected cryptographic functions. For example, if a circuit is able to correctly predict the $n$th bit of a key stream generated by a stream cipher just by observing previous $(n-1)$ bits, then this circuit serves as a next-bit predictor (Yao, 1982), breaking the security of the given stream cipher. When a circuit is able to distinguish output of the tested function from a truly random sequence, it serves as a random distinguisher (Englund et al., 2007) providing a warning sign of function weakness.

Note that a circuit need not provide correct answers for all inputs – it is sufficient if a correct answer is provided with a probability significantly better than random guessing.

When combined with evolutionary algorithms, the
whole process of circuit design consists of the following steps:

1. Several software circuits are randomly initialized (randomly selected functions in nodes, randomly assigned existence of connectors between nodes) forming population of candidate individuals. Every individual is represented by one circuit. Note that such a random circuit will most probably not provide any meaningful output for given inputs and can even have disconnected layers (no output at all).

2. If necessary, generate new test vectors used later by a so-called fitness function for evaluation (see Section 3.2 for discussion).

3. Every individual (circuit) in the population is emulated and obtained outputs are evaluated. The fitness function assigns a rating based on each individual success in given task (e.g., what fraction of inputs were correctly recognized as being output of a stream cipher rather than a completely random sequence, see Section 3.2 for details).

4. Based on the evaluation provided by the fitness function, a potentially improved population is generated by mutation and crossover operators from individuals taken from the previous generation. Design of every individual (circuit) may be changed by changing operations computed in nodes or adding/removing connectors between nodes in subsequent layers.

5. Repeat from step 2. Usually hundreds of thousands or more repeats are performed, therefore the evaluation of a single circuit in step 3 must be fast enough (currently, we are in the milliseconds range).

3.2 How to define problems to be solved by circuit

Evolutionary algorithms need to be supplied with a metric of success (so-called fitness function) that is applied to measure quality of a candidate individual. Proper definition of fitness function is crucial to obtain a working solution to the defined problem. In this work, we limit ourselves to randomness distinguishability as a target goal and devise the metric of success based on a number of test vectors correctly identified by the software circuit as the output from the cryptographic function or the stream of random data. Other goals like next-bit predictor (Yao, 1982) or defector of strict avalanche criterion (Webster and Tavares, 1986) can be used.

In this work, we aim to obtain a software circuit capable of correctly distinguishing between a block of bytes generated by a cryptographic function (eStream candidate) with an unknown key and truly random data. We worked with three scenarios with respect to the frequency of key change:

1. Key is fixed for all generated test sets and vectors. Even when test sets change, new test vectors are generated using the same key.

2. Every test set was generated using a different key. All test vectors in a particular test set are generated with the same key.

3. Every test vector (16 bytes) was generated using a different key.

The circuit input is a sequence of bytes produced either by the inspected function (first type) or generated completely randomly (second type). The circuit output is an encoding of the guessed source. Different encodings are possible: single bit (e.g., 0 meaning “random data” and 1 meaning “function output”) or multiple bits (e.g., low versus high Hamming weight of whole output byte). Results in this work use only byte’s highest bit for easier interpretation, but Hamming weight seems to be a better choice for later experiments. Additionally, a circuit can be allowed to make multiple guesses by producing multiple output bytes. A circuit thus has the possibility to express its own certainty in the predicted result (e.g., by setting 2 out of 3 outputs to predict random data and remaining one to predict the function output) as well as to evolve more than one predictor inside a single circuit.

A circuit is successful if able to distinguish function outputs from random sequences significantly better than by random guessing.

3.3 How to evaluate circuit performance?

For evaluation of a circuit performance, we use supervised learning with test sets containing pairs of inputs and expected outputs generated by a “teacher” prior to the evaluation. Since we generated the test sets, we also know which vectors were generated from function output and which were taken from random data. Outputs from a circuit for given inputs are compared with expected outputs and circuit performance is then rated as follows:

\[
\text{fitness} = \frac{\#(\text{correctly predicted test vectors})}{\#(\text{total test vectors})}
\]

For our experiments, we used the following settings to maintain a good trade-off between the evaluation time and statistics (influenced mainly by the number of test vectors) and the ability to prevent overlearning (influenced by the test set change frequency).
• Every test set contains 1000 test vectors with exactly half taken from inspected function’s output and second half taken from random data. Order of test vectors in the set is not important as test vectors are handled by circuit completely independently.
• Every test vector has length of 16 bytes.
• Test set is periodically changed every $100^{th}$ generation to prevent overlearning on a given test set.

3.4 Practical implementation

We represent a software circuit by a two-dimensional array with values in odd rows interpreted as nodes and values in even rows as masks defining existing connectors. The circuit simulator takes this array together with input values, passes inputs to the first layer of nodes and propagates values modified by elementary functions in nodes via connectors to the following layer. After processing all layers of circuit, values provided by the last layer are returned as the circuit output. For the start, we used the following elementary operations for nodes: no operation (NOP), logical functions (AND, OR, XOR, NOR, NAND), bit manipulating functions (ROTR, ROTL, BITSELECTOR), arithmetic functions (ADD, SUBS, MUL T, DIV, SUM), read a specified input byte even from an internal layer (READX) and produce a constant value (CONST). The implementation is available as an open-source project EACirc (EACirc project, 2013).

As optimization requires many evaluations of candidate circuits, we use our computation infrastructure with the BOINC control (Anderson, 2004) to perform distributed computation with more than thousand CPU cores. EACirc is implemented to coordinate computation based on logs of population of individuals and on the internal state, providing possibility to perform optimization with unlimited number of generations even when a computation node itself lasts only a limited time before reboot.

Truly random data used for test vectors were produced by the Quantum Random Bit Generator Service (QRBG) (Stevanović et al., 2008).

To ease understanding of our software circuits, we implemented an automatic removal of nodes and connectors that do not contribute to the resulting fitness value (pruning) and transformation into the Graphviz dot format for easy visualization.

To independently replicate results provided by a circuit emulator and to double check against possible implementation bugs, EACirc allows to transform the two-dimensional array with the circuit into the source code of a plain C program. The resulting C program can be compiled separately and computes only the circuit from which it was generated, but completely avoids the circuit emulator.

4 APPLICATION TO ESTREAM CANDIDATES

The testing methodology described in Section 3 was applied against candidate functions from the eStream competition (ECRYPT, 2004). We considered the availability of implementations with the same programming interface (API) for all candidates, where one can automatically test (both STS NIST/Dieharder and software circuit distinguisher) on a large number of functions with ease. Additionally, one can cherry-pick only such functions where a well-working circuit is found for further analysis. In this work, we focused primarily on the goal to obtain at least the same results as with STS NIST/Dieharder batteries. Previous works evaluated statistical properties of candidate functions with the full number of rounds as well as with a reduced number of rounds (Turan et al., 2006). Testing full number of rounds usually provides only limited information – either the function is very weak and exhibits weaknesses even in the full number of rounds or no defect at all is detected, even when an exploitable serious attack might exist for a limited number of rounds.

From 34 candidates in the eStream competition, 23 were potentially usable for testing (due to renamed or updated versions, problems with compilation, etc.). For the start, we limited ourselves to 7 of these (Decim, Grain, FUBUKI, Hermes, LEX, Salsa20 and TSC) having a structure that allows for a reduction of complexity by a decreased number of rounds in a straightforward way.

4.1 Settings used

For the Dieharder test battery, the following settings were used:

• 250 MB of data generated from a given function with 3 different key change frequencies;
• tests corresponding to the original Diehard battery were used (except for the Diehard sums test);
• each test was run once, length of the data stream actually used was decided by the test;
• based on the test results, sum over all tests (pass=1, weak=0.5, fail=0) is displayed.
For the STS NIST, the following settings were used:

- same source files with data as for Dieharder were used;
- each test runs 100 times on 1,000,000 bits;
- some runs had problems (error during test execution) with tests RandomExcursions and RandomExcursionsVariant. These tests are therefore not included in the results.

Note that we will not discuss all results in details as such discussion was already done several times before (Soto, 1999; Turan et al., 2006; Doganaksoy et al., 2010). We will focus only on the identification of the highest round where some defects are still detected and the significance of such detection – whether almost all tests fail or only a minority of them.

For the software circuit, we used the following settings:

- 5 layers, 8 nodes in every internal layer, 16 input nodes (corresponding to 16 input bytes in every test vector) and 2 output nodes.

For evolutionary algorithms, we used the following settings (based on our previous experience):

- Population consists of 20 individuals refreshed by the steady-state replacement strategy (Liu et al., 2008) with \( \frac{2}{5} \) of individuals replaced every generation.
- 30,000 generations were executed in a single evolution run with 30 separate evolution runs running in parallel.
- Mutation is applied with probability of 0.05 and changes function in given node or connector mask by addition or removal of connector to given node.
- Crossover is applied with probability of 0.5 and performs single point crossover with the first \( i \) layers taken from the first parent and remaining layers from the second parent.

Around 2.3 MB \( \left( \frac{30000}{100} \right) \cdot 500 \cdot 16B \) is required for evolution with 30,000 generations and the test set changed every 100\(^{th} \) generation. If 30 runs were executed in parallel (this was performed to obtain reliable samples), around 68 MB of data produced by a given function is required. However, all runs for eStream ended with the same success ratio and were therefore unnecessary in principle (tests with SHA-3 candidates provided more varying results).

We like to stress out that STS NIST and Dieharder make decision on all such data processed together in single pass. Our circuit will make decision on much smaller sample of 16 bytes only.

### 4.2 Results for eStream candidates

Tables 1–7 summarize results for selected eStream candidates depending on a number of algorithm rounds and also on the key change frequency. Visualization of example circuit is shown at Figure 2. Interpretation of values in tables 1–7 is the following: both statistical tests have several tests in battery – 20 for Diehard, 162 for STS NIST (for STS NIST, two groups of tests were omitted as mentioned earlier, otherwise the number of tests would be 188). Dieharder provides three levels of evaluation for a particular test: pass, weak, fail. Values 1, 0.5, 0 were assigned to these levels respectively and sum over all tests is computed and displayed. For STS NIST, number of all passed tests is displayed (this is deduced from the distribution of p-values across all 100 runs with respect to the significance level of \( \alpha = 0.01 \)).

For the software circuit (EACirc), the distinguisher success rate (fitness value) is computed on a fresh new test set never seen by a given circuit before. Two types of values are presented. When a distinguisher with at least 99% success rate for 50 consecutive test sets was found (very strong distinguisher), average number of generations (from 30 independent runs) necessary to find it is listed. When no such strong distinguisher is found, the average success rate is listed, computed as the average of averages of maximum fitness after test vector change (denoted as AAM). The first case provides a distinguisher that is almost always right. The second case provides a distinguisher sometimes giving a wrong answer, but still better than random guessing.

To verify results provided by the proposed approach, we first let circuits distinguish between two groups of test vectors, but with both taken from truly random data. Intuitively, our approach should fail to find a working distinguisher and should behave as random guessing. The predicted behaviour was confirmed by an experiment with same settings as these used for testing functions. All statistical tests from Dieharder (20/20) and STS NIST (162/162) successfully passed on such data, and no stable distinguisher was found. The average distinguisher success ratio computed in the same manner as for tested functions (AAM) was 0.52. Note that the value of 0.52 is equivalent to random guessing, although bigger than 0.5. The reason is that more than one individual is present in the population (20 individuals were used, 20 guesses instead of 1 are made, best one is used). Changing the number of individuals or the number of test vectors will influence the expected centre of distribution – the distinguisher success ratio shifts towards the value 0.5 when the number of individuals is
such a behaviour was observed in almost all evolved circuits, whereas the left circuit ignores four more inputs. Additionally, the left circuit is performing distinguisher functionality only in its first three layers, remaining two are only propagating values to output layer. Notice also the SUM function in the 4th layer (4_0_SUM) – it has no other functionality than to pass the output from the 3rd layer to the 5th (output) layer (equivalent of NOP) – a simple example of equivalent functionality encoded in multiple ways typical for evolutionary algorithms. Finally, observe nodes in the 5th layer of the right circuit – the same function (NOR) is performed over the same set of inputs from the 4th layer, outputting the same value into 0_OUT and 1_OUT. Such a behaviour was observed in almost all evolved circuits and is the consequence of circuit outputs interpretation (see Section 3.2).

Let us take Grain limited to 1 round as an example how to interpret data in Tables 1–7:

- For a key fixed over all tests (the key is set only once for the run), all tests from Dieharder and STS NIST failed, therefore the displayed value is 0. A software circuit found a strong 99% distinguisher in the 221st generation (on average).

- For the key changed every test set, all tests from Dieharder and STS NIST failed again, resulting in value 0. The software circuit was unable to find a strong 99% distinguisher, but found a distinguisher with approximately 0.67 success rate (AAM) – value (0.67) is displayed.

- For the key changed every test vector (every 16 bytes), Dieharder resulted in one fail and one weak test (all other passed), therefore the sum is 18.5. For STS NIST, all tests passed, resulting in value 162. The software circuit was unable to find any distinguisher better than random, having AAM value equal to 0.52, therefore (0.52) is displayed.

4.3 Verification of separate circuit

To cross-verify results found by the proposed approach, we took the source code representation of a circuit found and executed it without the circuit emulator directly over 100 000 test vectors. The results confirmed values obtained via circuit emulator.

5 DISCUSSION

Process of circuit optimization and circuits found can be analysed to understand how EAs progress towards a working solution and what makes circuit a working distinguisher. The following behaviour was observed:

- Different circuits with the same distinguishing success rate might be evolved, as is demonstrated with the example of Grain-2 (Figure 2), possibly with a significant diversity. A deeper analysis of shared components between different circuits may provide a better understanding of statistical defects detected in data.

- Fitness progress typical for evolutionary algorithms was observed. Intermediate solutions tend to overlearn on a particular testing set and sharply decrease once the testing set is changed (occurring every 100th generation), forming a jaw-like graph (see Figure 3). Once a genuine progress in the distinguisher success rate is achieved, over-learning still takes place, but the subsequent drop is not going down to random guessing.

- Not all nodes and connectors in input and inner layers are utilized for prediction. As such nodes and connectors can be automatically detected (no
Table 1: Results for Grain.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># of rounds</th>
<th>IV and key reinitialization</th>
<th>Dieharder (x/20)</th>
<th>STS NIST (x/162)</th>
<th>EACirc</th>
<th>Dieharder (x/20)</th>
<th>STS NIST (x/162)</th>
<th>EACirc</th>
<th>Dieharder (x/20)</th>
<th>STS NIST (x/162)</th>
<th>EACirc</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(n = 221)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(0.67)</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(n = 471)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(0.66)</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
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</table>

Table 2: Results for Decim.

<table>
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<th># of rounds</th>
<th>IV and key reinitialization</th>
<th>Dieharder (x/20)</th>
<th>STS NIST (x/162)</th>
<th>EACirc</th>
<th>Dieharder (x/20)</th>
<th>STS NIST (x/162)</th>
<th>EACirc</th>
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<th>STS NIST (x/162)</th>
<th>EACirc</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>0</td>
<td>(n = 2681)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>(0.85)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>(n = 1431)</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>146</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
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<td>(0.53)</td>
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<td>18.0</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
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<td>162</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Results for FUBUKI.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># of rounds</th>
<th>IV and key reinitialization</th>
<th>Dieharder (x/20)</th>
<th>STS NIST (x/162)</th>
<th>EACirc</th>
<th>Dieharder (x/20)</th>
<th>STS NIST (x/162)</th>
<th>EACirc</th>
<th>Dieharder (x/20)</th>
<th>STS NIST (x/162)</th>
<th>EACirc</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Results for Hermes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># of rounds</th>
<th>IV and key reinitialization</th>
<th>Dieharder (x/20)</th>
<th>STS NIST (x/162)</th>
<th>EACirc</th>
<th>Dieharder (x/20)</th>
<th>STS NIST (x/162)</th>
<th>EACirc</th>
<th>Dieharder (x/20)</th>
<th>STS NIST (x/162)</th>
<th>EACirc</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5: Results for LEX. Note that the internal structure of LEX responds differently to the limitation of number of rounds (when compared to other algorithms). LEX internally prepares 4 bytes of data during every round as output stream. Limitation of the number of rounds will only limit number of bytes in the output, not the strength of output data. Since we are testing 16 bytes of input data, 4 rounds will generate enough internal output bytes to encrypt it as a full round version.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># of rounds</th>
<th>IV and key reinitialization</th>
<th>once for run</th>
<th>for each test set</th>
<th>for each test vector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dieharder</td>
<td>STS NIST</td>
<td>EACire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(x/20)</td>
<td>(x/162)</td>
<td>(x/162)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>n = 148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n = 221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n = 378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Results for Salsa20.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># of rounds</th>
<th>IV and key reinitialization</th>
<th>once for run</th>
<th>for each test set</th>
<th>for each test vector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dieharder</td>
<td>STS NIST</td>
<td>EACire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(x/20)</td>
<td>(x/162)</td>
<td>(x/162)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(0.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(0.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Results for TSC. Note that the TSC algorithm does not fill data into all output structures before round 9. During the first 8 rounds, only parts of memory are set by function output, leaving remaining memory filled with memory garbage (values present in the memory before allocation).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># of rounds</th>
<th>IV and key reinitialization</th>
<th>once for run</th>
<th>for each test set</th>
<th>for each test vector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dieharder</td>
<td>STS NIST</td>
<td>EACire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(x/20)</td>
<td>(x/162)</td>
<td>(x/162)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-8</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>n = 104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n = 234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>n = 188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 3: Example of success rate for distinguisher evolution between two sets of random data, the data set changed every 100th generation (dotted line corresponds to average success of random guessing). Although no structure is present in data, the circuit is overlearning on a particular data set and thus exhibiting better success rate than random guess (increasing part of curve) before the test set is changed (a sudden drop in the success rate).

Figure 4: Fitness progress over 30000 generations for Salsa20 reduced to 2 rounds and with a fixed key for all test sets. Although sometimes the distinguishing success rate drops down to random guess when a key set was changed, the circuit is quickly able to learn back to a high success rate. Such a behaviour motivated us to compute and display the AAM value rather than a single value of the best individual from last round. Also, the circuit is (over-)learning very quickly to a particular data set. Such a behaviour led us to inspect the overlearning speed as a potential metric of success instead of how well the circuit is working after a test vector change.
change to the fitness value when temporarily removed), a pruned version of the circuit is easier to analyse.

5.1 Comparison of software circuit with STS NIST/Dieharder batteries

Based on results obtained with the proposed approach (software circuits designed by genetic programming), a comparison to statistical batteries like STS NIST and Dieharder can be undertaken:

Advantages:
- The proposed method is based on a completely different approach than statistical tests used in batteries, opening space for detecting dependencies between solutions not covered by tests from batteries.
- The proposed method offers possibility to construct a distinguisher based on a dynamically constructed algorithm rather than a predefined one from batteries.
- Once a working distinguisher is found, it requires extremely short sequences (tested on 16 bytes only) to detect function output. Statistical batteries require at least several megabytes of data.
- Once a distinguisher is found (time intensive operation), it can be used to quickly process additional test vectors produced with different keys.
- Lower amount of data extracted from a given function is necessary to provide a working distinguisher (at maximum, we used 2.2 MB). Data required by STS NIST and Dieharder were larger (more than 200 MB required for some Dieharder tests). Note that some tests may provide indication of failure even when less data is available.

Disadvantages:
- Because of very short sequences the circuit is working on, subtle statistical defects may not be detected. However, several modifications to the proposed approach might be used to process large sequences instead of 16 bytes only (e.g., circuit with memory executed iteratively over large data partitioned to 16 bytes chunks) – testing such modifications is now on our agenda.
- The resulting distinguisher may be hard to analyse – what is the weakness detected and what should be fixed in the function design?
- EA based approach may require significantly higher computational requirements to test the candidate function during the evolution phase of software circuit. Evaluation of an evolved circuit (e.g., distinguisher) is then very fast.
- A distinguisher found may be fitted to a particular candidate function (and possibly even a particular key, if the key is not changed periodically in the training set) instead of discovering generic defects in the tested function.

To verify usability of the proposed methodology against a wider set of functions than stream ciphers from the eStream competition, we applied the described methodology also against 18 selected functions from the SHA-3 competition. As these algorithms provide only fixed and short sequences, hash of value of randomly initialized counter is used to obtain data from the algorithms passed to statistical tests. Results obtained confirmed the results against eStream candidates.

6 CONCLUSIONS

We proposed a general design of a cryptoanalytical tool based on genetic programming and applied it to the problem of finding a random distinguisher for several stream ciphers (with a reduced number of rounds) taken from the eStream competition. In general, the proposed approach proved to be capable of closely matching the performance of the NIST statistical testing suite (except for the Decim algorithm) and with several exceptions also to the Dieharder battery. A robust evaluation was performed to obtain an average success rate over various scenarios w.r.t. the key change frequency as well as the number of rounds to which the target stream cipher is limited to.

The proposed approach provides a novel way of inspecting statistical defects in cryptographic functions and may provide a significant advantage when working with very short sequences (such as 16 bytes) once the learning phase of evolution is completed. Our future work will cover techniques that will enable providing significantly more data as circuit input to provide more fair comparison to STS NIST and Dieharder batteries, which are making statistical analysis on tens (STS NIST) up to hundreds (Dieharder) of megabytes of data.

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\[1\] Detailed results can be found at http://www.fi.muni.cz/~xavenda/papers/secrypt2013/.
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